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Their Development and Courses from Confrontation  
to Cooperation
Werner Rahn
GERMAN NAVIES FROM 1848 TO 2016
 Military history deals with the evolution and structure of armed forces and their position in state and society� In this sense, naval history is taken 
to mean that part of military history that concentrates its studies on the navy� 
However, when dealing with fields of research, one sphere provides the greatest 
challenge for military and naval historians: warfare in the widest sense�1
In his book The Face of Battle, British historian John Keegan points out that many 
historians are shy about exploring the profundities and realities of war�2 Generally 
speaking, we can expect naval or other military historians to have a certain affin-
ity for the subject of their research� They should have a basic knowledge about the 
military, in the same way that we expect an economic historian to have a sound 
basic knowledge of economic theory� But Keegan is justified in demanding that 
the military historian spend as much time as possible among military personnel, 
“because the quite chance observation of trivial incidents may illuminate his � � � 
understanding of all sorts of problems from the past which will otherwise almost 
certainly remain obscured�”3 Like any historian, the naval historian bears a great 
responsibility in his striving after historical truth, if he wants to be taken seri-
ously� The uncritical patriotic history that used to glorify naval actions should be 
a thing of the past�
Today, some historians tend to judge personalities, events, and structures ac-
cording to today’s moral categories� They end up “putting the past on trial, and 
since the critical historian, armed with his generation’s self-confidence or with 
his progressive concept of the future, knows everything better, in this trial he will 
be prosecutor, judge, and legislator all in one�”4
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In 1957, the German navy began to develop a new approach to studying its 
own history� That year, the first fleet commander in chief, Rear Admiral Rolf 
Johannesson (1900–89), organized the Historical-Tactical Conference� Since 
then it has been held every year, and is now a standard element of the naval of-
ficer’s historical education� Johannesson’s aim was to distance his service from 
subjective naval history about World War I�5 He hoped that a critical discussion of 
the past would teach his officers truth, loyalty, and moral courage, and that they 
would determine their own position more solidly by recourse to history and the 
federal constitution� Through 2016, fifty-six conferences have been held, covering 
a wide variety of subjects�6 Papers usually are presented by junior officers from 
the fleet, assisted by naval historians� The presentation of the papers and the can-
did discussion of subjects relevant to the business of the day usually provide testi-
mony to the intellectual talents among the navy’s officer corps� Many an admiral-
to-be made a mark when as a lieutenant he presented some critical theory about 
history—provoking the older generation’s opposition�
It is a perennial challenge to historians even to come close to historical truth� 
The commercial success of popular publications, as well as the large number 
of visitors attracted to museums, indicates how many people have historical 
interests� Such continuing interest is a stimulating challenge for professional 
historians� We should continue to try to present our findings about background 
information and structures from the past in such a way that the message gets 
across—meaning that historical knowledge and historical sensitivity become 
factors serving to help stabilize a liberal society�
THE BIRTH OF A GERMAN NAVY
The first German navy worthy to bear such designation was established in 1848, 
when a conflict over the duchy of Schleswig resulted in a war with Denmark�7 At 
that time, Germany could do nothing against the Danes’ efficient blockade; ocean 
trade came to a standstill� This dilemma resulted in a rather emotional movement 
that advocated building up a fleet� The issue soon captivated the members of the 
national assembly that had convened at Frankfurt’s Saint Paul’s Cathedral only a 
short time before� On June 14, 1848, by an overwhelming majority, the first Ger-
man parliament voted a large appropriation to build a fleet�8
Prince Adalbert of Prussia (1811–73), who had concerned himself with 
maritime problems rather early, played an important part in those first maritime 
plans� In May 1848, he published a memorandum on the buildup of a German 
fleet that became, so to speak, the Magna Carta of the German navy� By analyz-
ing the maritime-strategic situation of Prussia and Germany and having taken 
into consideration already the imminent technical revolution, it formed the first 
theoretical basis for a German naval concept� The memorandum included three 
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models on which Germany might establish a navy: (1) providing mere coastal 
defense; (2) defending sea lines of communication (SLOCs); or (3) building up 
an independent sea power� Prince Adalbert, however, clearly emphasized that 
even steps leading toward the buildup of an independent sea power would in-
volve many risks, and that once this option had been chosen there could be no 
stopping halfway�9
During the preparations for the buildup of a fleet, it soon became clear that 
almost all requirements—in personnel, matériel, and organization—could not be 
met� It was, therefore, only natural to ask for foreign assistance� Arnold Duckwitz 
(1802–81), the first German secretary of the navy, in October 1848 forwarded an 
official request to the American government for assistance in building up, with 
regard to personnel and matériel, a German fleet� In the United States, the Ger-
man liberal revolution had been observed with interest and with an open mind� 
Thus, the German requests met with a positive response within both private and 
official circles� First contacts were established by the frigate USS St. Lawrence, 
commanded by Captain Hiram Paulding (1797–1878), which was visiting 
Bremerhaven in the fall of 1848� The ship and crew were received enthusiasti-
cally as envoys of a hoped-for ally� The U�S� Navy immediately began personnel- 
support activities by rendering assistance with training: the frigate took aboard 
four Prussian sea cadets for practical exposure� Captain Paulding, as an adviser, 
was for weeks the center of attention during all discussions on the fleet buildup, 
which were held in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Hannover� The matériel support con-
centrated on providing a modern frigate, which was equipped at the New York 
Naval Yard and transferred to Europe in the summer of 1849�10
Even though the duration and the scope of this first American military aid to 
Germany were limited, that assistance provided early evidence of an American 
policy of being ready and able to support, across the Atlantic, the principles of 
democracy and liberalism� On both sides of that ocean, common goals and mu-
tual sympathy for the liberal-democratic forces resulted in the first steps toward 
cooperation� How close these idealistic ties actually were became evident after 
the Frankfurt National Assembly failed, when high emigration rates resulted 
from disappointed democrats finding their spiritual home in the United States� 
One example was Carl Schurz (1829–1906), who later became Secretary of the 
Interior� Such a “brain drain” strengthened the hand of conservative forces in 
Germany—the consequences of which are well known�
The German navy remained in existence even after the dream of a united 
Reich had long gone and the reality of particularism governed German poli-
tics� However, in 1853 the fleet was disbanded and its few ships were sold or 
scrapped�11 Only Prussia, with its relatively longer coastline, still had available a 
limited number of naval forces, proudly named the Royal Prussian Navy�
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Yet the idea of the navy as an instrument of national unification stayed alive 
even after 1848� After the foundation of the Reich in 1871, the navy’s function 
as a symbol of German unity was stressed officially, in contrast to the army’s 
organization by individual states� The very term Imperial Navy emphasized that 
this instrument of power was subject directly to the Reich� The personnel of the 
Imperial German Navy (IGN) came from all parts of Germany, and the fleet be-
came, as Tirpitz (see below) once put it, a “melting pot of teutonicism�”12
However, until 1897 the navy’s development was overshadowed by that of the 
army� The navy’s contributions to the wars against Denmark in 1864, Austria in 
1866, and France in 1870–71 seemingly were of no importance� Strategically, the 
IGN concentrated on providing a forward coastal defense�13
STRATEGIC ROOTS OF BUILDING A GERMAN BATTLE FLEET
In 1894, spurred by the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), the 
German naval high command prepared a strategic concept for the buildup of a 
battle fleet�14 Captain Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930), then chief of staff of the 
naval high command, seems to have taken the initiative to formulate the famous 
Dienstschrift (Service Memorandum) No� IX, under the misleading title “Gen-
eral Lessons Learned from the Fleet Autumn Exercise�”15
In this memorandum, Tirpitz resolutely pleads that strategic offensive ac-
tions should be considered “normal tasks of a fleet�”16 Such actions should aim 
at bringing about “the earliest possible initiation of a battle,” a battle that would 
reach the “main decision” of naval warfare� That decision could not be reached by 
a cruiser war, such as was prescribed under the tenets of the French Jeune École 
school of thought, but “only by permanent naval supremacy and lasting pressure 
on the enemy�”17
Owing to Germany’s position in the heart of Central Europe, its long coasts 
on the North and Baltic Seas, and its borders with eight neighboring nations, any 
strategy of the Reich that did not rely on strong alliance partners required it to 
decide whether a threat should be neutralized defensively or eliminated offen-
sively� As long as Germany considered only France as a potential enemy (and later 
Russia as well), the offensive strategic concept for naval operations that Tirpitz 
laid down in Service Memorandum No� IX seemed appropriate�
In June 1897, Tirpitz was appointed state secretary in the Reichsmarineamt 
(Imperial Naval Office)�18 Not least because of his influence, the politics of the 
Reich gradually expanded to consider the risks involved in confronting Britain� 
For Tirpitz, England was, from the beginning, “the most dangerous naval enemy,” 
against which Germany “most urgently required a certain measure of naval force 
as a political power factor�” Since Tirpitz considered cruiser warfare a lost cause, 
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owing to Germany’s lack of naval bases, he asked for the buildup of a fleet that 
“can unfold its greatest military potential between Heligoland and the Thames�”19
Elsewhere within the IGN there were well-founded doubts regarding this 
conceptualization� Captain Curt Freiherr von Maltzahn (1849–1930), who at 
that time taught tactics and naval history at the German naval academy, warned 
as early as 1898 that reaching “Seeherrschaft” (sea control) by means of a battle 
would not suffice by itself to impose peace on the opponent, for such sea control 
would have to be maintained and exploited� This would require a surplus of 
strength� As long as neither party achieved sea control, the weaker party would be 
confined to fighting against the achievement of sea control by its enemy, forgoing 
victory as the goal of its own combat actions� It would be important to maintain a 
national seaborne trade “corresponding in strength to the means deployed for de-
fense�”20 Maltzahn considered a combination of squadron operations and cruiser 
war to be the most suitable naval strategy� “Squadron operations are indispens-
able in this type of warfare, but they are only a means and not an end, and they 
become only really valuable if the freedom of action thus gained is exploited�”21
However, such a foresighted and realistic alternative, one that combined a 
balanced defensive fleet with strong cruiser elements, stood no chance in the 
IGN� Tirpitz repressed any further strategic discussions so as not to jeopardize 
the buildup of the fleet, which had received legislative backing and thereafter was 
scheduled to be accomplished over an extended period�22
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE: THE NAVAL ARMAMENT RACE
The objectives and planning principles of the German battle fleet construction 
can be summarized as follows: The basic prerequisite for gaining sea control was 
the destruction, or at least the decisive weakening, of the enemy battle fleet� Thus, 
planning focused on the fleet’s capability to impose a decision in battle� The battle 
fleet also was considered a political means of power that could enable Germany 
to defend its overseas interests adequately� Britain, the most dangerous potential 
opponent, was to be deterred from a war with Germany by means of a strong 
fleet, or, should deterrence fail, was to be engaged successfully�
Among the liberal bourgeoisie, the naval policy met with strong support, 
which was increased even further by propaganda skillfully directed� However, 
while drawing up its ambitious armament program, Germany misjudged the 
dangers arising from its geographical situation in Central Europe� Any German 
approach that strove to establish an international maritime stature and adopt a 
counterpoint stance toward Britain was bound to be met with profound suspicion 
from Britain� After the German-British alliance talks in 1901 failed to produce 
any tangible results—the two sides were pursuing incompatible objectives—the 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   6 8/7/17   11:58 AM
5
Rahn: German Navies from 1848 to 2016: Their Development and Courses fr
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 1 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
buildup of the German battle fleet became and remained a crucial disruptive 
factor, preventing any subsequent arrangement with Britain and resulting in an 
arms race�
From 1905 onward, that escalatory dynamic was characterized by an enor-
mous increase in the combat power of battleships� With the construction of HMS 
Dreadnought in 1905–1906, the Royal Navy set a new standard� Tirpitz had to 
keep pace if the IGN was to remain equal, ship for ship, with its potential enemy� 
As a result, his long-term financial planning had been in vain, for the construc-
tion of capital ships involved ever-increasing costs�
Britain could cope with the cost increases involved in the construction of capi-
tal ships, or at least it had to do so since its security was exclusively dependent 
on the superiority of the Royal 
Navy� In contrast, the defense 
of Germany was primarily 
an army responsibility, with 
the navy playing a secondary 
role� Britain’s first lord of the 
Admiralty Winston Churchill 
(1874–1965) explained this in a public speech in February 1912� The strategic 
situations of both countries, Churchill pointed out, made his own fleet a vital 
necessity to the British Empire, whereas “from some points of view, the German 
Navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury�”23
Groaning under the burden of high naval expenditures, in 1912 both govern-
ments tried again to come to an agreement that they hoped would reduce the 
building rates of capital ships� In February 1912, the British cabinet sent Secretary 
of State for War Richard B� Haldane, 1st Viscount Haldane (1856–1928), to Berlin 
to try to reach a general settlement in these matters� However, Lord Haldane’s 
talks with the German side never converted into real negotiations, and the ef-
fort failed after a few days� The British were unwilling “to commit themselves to 
neutrality,” and the German side—under pressure from Tirpitz—was unwilling 
to modify the country’s planned building rate�24 Tirpitz appreciated that for Eng-
land “the Entente with France gives her the best security against a too powerful 
Germany,” he said� “I no longer believe that we can get out of this vicious circle�”25 
As Germany did not have enough resources to fulfill all the requirements of both 
the army and the navy, the IGN could not keep up in the unconstrained arms 
race that commenced thereafter, even though by 1914 it had become the world’s 
second-strongest navy�
Before 1914, modern warships, such as capital ships, cruisers, and torpedo 
boats, were not only part of a nation’s military potential but striking evidence 
We should continue to try to present our find-
ings about . . . the past in such a way that . . . 
historical knowledge and . . . sensitivity be-
come factors serving to help stabilize a liberal 
society.
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of its industrial and technological capability� Only highly industrialized nations 
could solve on their own the complex technological problems that the transition 
to modern capital ships involved� This was particularly true for the new technolo-
gies of engines and weapons, as well as for the improvement in ship survivability 
achieved through the use of high-quality steel armor�26
The period between 1905 and 1914 was characterized by a technological revo-
lution that made naval weapons obsolete rapidly� This applied to cruisers, tor-
pedo boats, and submarines as well as larger units� During the first major naval 
battles of World War I, the decisive effects of superior speed and more powerful 
guns became apparent�
STRATEGY AND GEOGRAPHY
Tirpitz based his strategic concept on the assumption that the Royal Navy always 
would act offensively in a war against Germany; in particular, it would establish 
a close blockade of the German coast� Such a blockade near Heligoland “would 
provide abundant opportunities to equalize naval strength” or to “enter into a 
decisive battle�”27 For the IGN, this hypothetical battle became an element of 
dogma—the focal point of its operational concept and fleet training� For this 
reason, knowledge of and experience with weapons technology, tactics, and 
shiphandling were more-decisive factors in the careers of naval officers than 
qualification in staff assignments—which had a long-term effect on the choice of 
personnel for command-and-control appointments� The work of the Admiral-
stab (naval staff), established in 1899, and the creation of a specialized corps of 
staff officers to man it, seemed secondary in importance� As a consequence, the 
naval officer corps remained unprepared for the complex strategic dimensions of 
a naval war against Britain�28
Although all the preparations focused on the “decisive battle,” a great deal of 
confusion existed regarding the true purpose of the battle�29 While those staffing 
the German naval command had adopted Mahan’s theory of sea power willingly, 
they paid only lip service to a central element of that theory: the importance of 
geographical position and the resultant strategic options� By throttling Germany’s 
seaborne trade, an opponent could decide a “war by severing an artery essential 
to the existence of Germany�”30
An incorrect assessment of the effects of geography on British naval opera-
tions led the German naval leadership to a faulty assessment of British strategy� 
Britain had never attempted to eliminate an opponent’s navy at any price; it did so 
only when the British Isles and their SLOCs in the Atlantic were threatened� And 
these SLOCs remained outside the range of the German naval forces, except for a 
few cruisers and, later, submarines� To maintain a close blockade of the German 
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coast, the Royal Navy would have found it useful to eliminate the German fleet 
at an early date, but the Admiralty was well aware that such a strategic offensive 
would involve considerable losses� Especially cognizant of the threat that German 
torpedo boats, submarines, and mines represented, after 1911–12 the Royal Navy 
no longer considered deploying its Grand Fleet to the southern North Sea�31 In 
November 1912, the Admiralty issued a set of “General Instructions” to its war 
plans against Germany, summarizing Britain’s strategic approach as follows:
The general idea is to use our geographical advantage of position to cut off all Ger-
man shipping from oceanic trade and to secure the British coasts from any serious 
military enterprise and incidentally but effectually to cover the transport across the 
Channel of an Expeditionary Force to France� � � � It is believed that the prolongation 
of a distant blockade will inflict injury upon German interests� � � � To relieve such a 
situation, Germany would be tempted to send into the North Sea a force sufficient  
� � � to offer a general action� Such an action or actions would take place far from the 
German coast and close to our own�32
This plan implied a new wartime deployment for the Grand Fleet: basing it at 
Scapa Flow, in the Scottish Orkneys�
When in 1912 the German naval staff discovered the new orientation of its 
potential enemy, the chief of naval staff, Vice Admiral August von Heeringen 
(1855–1927), examined in a war game whether and how Germany’s High Seas 
Fleet could counter a distant blockade� The result was sobering� The Blue (i�e�, 
German) war-gaming party had advanced its squadrons as far as the Firth of 
Forth, but there they encountered difficulties and suffered considerable losses 
while withdrawing� The admiral concluded: “If the British really restrict their 
activities to the remote blockade and consistently hold back their battle fleet, then 
the role of our beautiful High Seas Fleet could be a very sad one in wartime� The 
submarines will have to do the job�”33
It must be left open what type of submarine employment Heeringen had in 
mind, but his estimate hit the central strategic problem for German naval war-
fare during World War I� Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the role of the submarine as a naval weapon “had grown from base to 
coast defence and from this to an offensive task in enemy waters�”34 Basically, the 
submarine was a mobile torpedo boat with long endurance� Submerged, a subma-
rine made only slow progress—but it had the ability to vanish below the surface 
of the sea for several hours�
In comparison with other naval powers, the IGN came late to building sub-
marines� The first one, U-1 (282 tons), was commissioned in December 1906� 
Obviously, Tirpitz had waited until he was sure that submarines were an effective 
offensive weapon� After 1908, he ordered more than forty oceangoing subma-
rines, of which twenty-eight had been completed before war broke out�35
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WORLD WAR I
When Britain joined the war on the side of France and Russia in August 1914, 
it became clear that the German High Seas Fleet could not perform its politi-
cal function of deterrence� Britain, relying on its superior fleet and the strategic 
positions the country and its empire held worldwide to protect its vital SLOCs, 
considered the German fleet, which could operate only from the North Sea, to 
be an acceptable risk�36
In August 1914, the IGN lay under the spell of great enemy superiority� The 
naval command placed all its hopes on reducing enemy forces through offensive 
submarine and minelaying operations� The assumption was that the opponent 
would seek battle, but Germany’s fleet was to be employed in such a battle only 
“under favorable conditions�”37
Although the few German cruisers stationed overseas at the outbreak of war 
were quite successful in guerre de course (warfare against merchant vessels), the 
Royal Navy soon neutralized them� Germany’s East Asiatic Squadron, under Vice 
Admiral Maximilian von Spee (1861–1914) moved across the Pacific Ocean and 
destroyed a British squadron off Chile, but its advance to the Falkland Islands 
in the South Atlantic on December 8, 1914, proved fatal�38 The example demon-
strates that the IGN neither recognized nor made use of the strategic advantages 
it might have derived from coordinating the operations of its naval forces over-
seas with those at home�
However, one small but powerful German squadron did influence the balance 
of forces and the overall course of World War I: the Mediterranean Division, 
comprising the battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau, under Rear 
Admiral Wilhelm A� Souchon (1864–1946)� The breakthrough of the two units to 
Constantinople and their formal handover to Turkey in August 1914 influenced 
Turkey to join the war on the side of the Central powers in October 1914� The 
Turkish straits (the Dardanelles and the Bosporus) became impassable for the 
Allies; all their attempts to penetrate them failed, with heavy losses�39 Thus, the 
second important route to Russia, other than the Baltic Sea, remained blocked, 
contributing to Russia’s loss as an ally of the Entente in 1917� After the war, Sir 
Julian S� Corbett commented as follows on this German strategic success:
When we consider that the Dardanelles was mined, that no permission to enter it 
had been ratified, and that everything depended on the German powers of cajolery at 
Constantinople, when we also recall the world wide results that ensued, it is not too 
much to say that few naval decisions more bold and well-judged were ever taken� So 
completely, indeed, did the risky venture turn a desperate situation into one of high 
moral and material advantage, that for the credit of German statesmanship it goes far 
to balance the cardinal blunder of attacking France through Belgium�40
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The various operations the High Seas Fleet conducted in the North and Baltic 
Seas, which culminated in the battle of Jutland in May 1916, cannot conceal the 
fact that primarily it performed the functions of a “fleet in being”: securing the 
German coast, blocking the Baltic approaches, and keeping clear the submarines’ 
sailing routes�41
In the first few months of the war, the submarine gave a striking demon-
stration of its power� On September 22, 1914, U-9 (Lieutenant Otto Weddigen 
[1880–1915], commanding) sank three aged armored cruisers in an hour� At 
first, the Royal Navy could not believe the cruisers “had been attacked by a single 
submarine and attributed the disaster to a whole flotilla�”42 Over the next couple 
of weeks, the U-boats extended their patrols; by October 1914, U-20 had pen-
etrated the Channel to attack transports on their way to France, circumnavigated 
the British Isles, and returned to Germany, having cruised 2,200 miles in eighteen 
days�43
Commerce Raiding by U-boats, 1915–18
The varied arguments concerning the degree of success German submarines 
achieved in their raiding against Britain’s maritime commerce are a classic exam-
ple of the civil-military struggle of a nation at war� At the time, this struggle was 
influenced greatly by public opinion, for submarine warfare became a popular 
myth to which a large number of Germans subscribed; they believed the U-boat 
was some sort of infallible, magic weapon that would bring victory� Because of 
some successful surprise raids, not only the public but the naval command over-
estimated the efficiency of submarines�
Initial considerations within the IGN regarding the employment of subma-
rines against British shipping had not yielded a clear picture by the time Tirpitz 
spoke publicly on the issue—which he did without consulting Chancellor Theo-
bald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856–1921) or chief of naval staff Admiral Hugo 
von Pohl (1855–1916)� In response to the British threat to “strangulate the [Ger-
man] economy with the help of a blockade,” as Churchill had put it in a speech 
on November 9, Tirpitz responded in an interview that Germany could “play the 
same game”—by torpedoing all British shipping�44
This triggered a passionate public debate that had repercussions for the naval 
command� The young historian Gerhard Ritter (1888–1967) knew from his own 
experience during the war that
[i]t was Tirpitz’s interview that poured more oil on the fire when it was published in 
late December� Thenceforth the question of submarine warfare was no longer a naval 
problem for the experts to judge, but a political issue of the first order, with everyone 
having his say� A “U-boat movement” quickly came into being� � � � Again the aca-
demic superpatriots were in the forefront with plans and petitions to the Chancellor 
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and the navy on how to starve Britain into submission� Some of the most renowned 
names at the University of Berlin were among them�45
The naval staff encouraged support for commerce warfare from the govern-
ment; however, the method’s prospects for success could not be assessed, because 
so few submarines were available� Of the twenty-two submarines in the North Sea 
in early 1915, only fourteen (those with diesel engines) could operate west of the 
British Isles� The chancellor came under both public and naval pressure while 
making his decision, and he relied too much on the navy staff ’s optimistic fore-
cast� Early in February 1915, Bethmann-Hollweg gave his consent to submarine 
warfare—without either the government or the naval command having analyzed 
thoroughly the methodology of commerce raiding itself or the associated politi-
cal risks and international complications�
The German proclamation of February 4, 1915, declared “the waters around 
Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, to be a war 
zone in which every merchant ship encountered would be destroyed, without it 
always being possible to assure the safety of passengers and crew� Because of the 
British misuse of neutral flags, it might not always be possible to prevent attacks 
meant for hostile ships from falling on neutrals�”46 By conducting commerce war-
fare in this way, Germany opened new issues in international law, because subma-
rines could not adhere adequately to the classic prize rules� This was particularly 
so after the British began arming merchant vessels, and later created disguised 
British auxiliary cruisers (Q-ships), which were a great threat to U-boats�
Despite these challenges, the commanding officers of German submarines, 
displaying a combination of caution and skill, achieved remarkable results with 
their deck guns while managing to comply with the prize regulations� Owing to 
a lack of space, submarines could not embark survivors, but in many cases they 
towed lifeboats to nearby coasts� However, the German naval staff criticized this 
practice: “The deterring effect of the submarine war will be lost if it is felt that 
passing the blockade zone is no longer a serious risk to the lives of the crews�”47 
Without providing its submarine commanding officers with clear instructions, 
the naval command obviously assumed that most ships would be sunk by torpe-
does without warning, further deterring neutral shipping�
When the U�S� government raised concerns about the way the war was being 
waged and referred to the international principles of naval warfare, the chief of 
the general staff, General Erich von Falkenhayn (1861–1922), feared the United 
States might enter the war� He wanted a guarantee that submarine warfare would 
force England “to give in” within six weeks� When the kaiser inquired about the 
matter, Tirpitz and the new chief of naval staff, Vice Admiral Gustav Bachmann 
(1860–1943), confirmed this amazing forecast—without explaining what they 
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meant by England’s “giving in�” On February 12, Bachmann wrote to Admiral 
Pohl, then commander in chief of the High Seas Fleet: “It is in the military inter-
est to make submarine warfare as effective as possible� Do not shy away from 
sinking enemy passenger liners� Their loss will cause the greatest impact�”48
The first serious instances of confrontation with the United States arose from 
German naval activities� On May 7, 1915, the submarine U-20 sank the British 
passenger liner Lusitania (31,550 gross registered tons [GRT]), using only one 
torpedo� This attack was conducted without warning and claimed the lives of 
1,198 civilians, including 126 Americans; however, it was established later that 
Lusitania had been carrying some war matériel in its forecastle�
This incident caused a severe diplomatic rift with the United States� President 
Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) called on Germany to adhere to the accepted 
principles of naval warfare and to respect the safety of American citizens travel-
ing in the war zone� Following a similar incident in August 1915, the German 
government yielded� In September, over the objection of the naval command, 
commerce raiding was ordered stopped west of the British Isles; only in the 
North and Mediterranean Seas was commerce raiding continued, and then in 
accordance with the prize regulations�
By early 1916, the number of operational U-boats had risen to fifty-one� In-
tensified submarine warfare, as demanded by the chief of general staff, resumed 
in February 1916� It aimed at sinking armed British merchant vessels, without 
warning, while sparing passenger liners� But the French Channel steamer Sussex 
was torpedoed on March 24, 1916, and another severe crisis between Germany 
and the United States ensued� On April 18, 1916, Washington threatened to sever 
diplomatic relations�49
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg now saw his earlier pessimistic assessment of 
the situation confirmed� From the onset of the new stage of submarine warfare, 
he had doubted the need for such a hazardous venture, “which would claim as a 
stake our existence as a great power and the future of our nation in its entirety, 
while the chance of winning, that is, the prospect of bringing England down by 
fall, is a rather uncertain one�”50
So the chancellor provided assurance to Washington that merchant vessels 
“would not be sunk without warning or without saving people’s lives�”51 As a 
result, the frontline commanders of the IGN (i�e�, of the High Seas Fleet and the 
German marine corps in Flanders), acting on their own initiative—later backed 
up by the naval command—moved their submarines out of the western operating 
areas because they felt that operating under prize regulations exposed their ves-
sels to great danger� Commerce raiding under the prize regulations was contin-
ued only in the Mediterranean� In the North Sea, the submarines operated against 
military targets until September 1916, without achieving any significant results�
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This extreme reaction—transferring submarines out of the operating areas 
entirely—was inconsistent with the actual situation� Of the thirty-five subma-
rines that had been lost by June 1916, only four had been destroyed by Q-ships, 
and none had been destroyed by armed merchant vessels�
Submarines’ promising capabilities for commerce raiding, even under the 
prize regulations, became more discernible in summer 1916�52 The resumption of 
submarine warfare under the prize regulations provoked no political risks while 
achieving considerable results: the monthly average of sinkings between October 
1916 and January 1917 was 189 merchant vessels, of 324,742 GRT� This was not 
enough to force a decision 
in the war against Britain, 
but the war economy of the 
Allies was damaged heavily 
enough to produce a chance 
for a negotiated peace� Still, 
the naval command, in a rigid 
and dogmatic manner, repeat-
edly demanded “unrestricted submarine warfare�” The IGN was convinced that 
this would result in decisive victory, even presuming the expected break with the 
United States�
The naval staff decided to test the U�S� government by sending a submarine 
to the U�S� East Coast� On October 7, 1916, thirty-one-year-old Lieutenant Hans 
Rose (1885–1969), endowed with powers equivalent to those of an ancient Ro-
man proconsul (his wording), headed his submarine, U-53, for Newport, Rhode 
Island, as a demonstration of the efficiency of German submarines—and as a 
warning to the U�S� Navy� After a three-hour visit to the Naval War College, Rose 
departed Newport—and sank five enemy merchant ships off the American coast, 
under prize rules� Sixteen U�S� destroyers observed this action at close range�53
The atmosphere and attitude among German naval officers at that time were 
portrayed in a diary entry by Lieutenant Ernst von Weizsäcker (1882–1951) of 
September 27, 1916� “The naval officers are sitting around, drinking, talking 
politics, hatching plots, and into the bargain feel patriotic, trying, in a dishonest 
way, to force submarine warfare� Submarine warfare is designed to conceal the 
foolish things done in developing the fleet and employing the fleet in war� This 
inadmissible propaganda evidences their bad consciences�”54
However, the propaganda Weizsäcker mentioned was effective� This was es-
pecially significant since the new general headquarters of all army forces, under 
Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) and General Erich Ludendorff 
(1865–1937), realized that the attrition campaign had failed and that, as things 
stood, victory in France was becoming less and less likely�
[T]he first German secretary of the navy in 
October 1848 forwarded an official request 
to the American government for assistance 
in building up . . . a German fleet. . . . [T]he 
German requests met with a positive response 
within both private and official circles.
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Unlike the military, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg intended to avoid U�S� 
entry into the war on the Allied side� He hoped that President Wilson would ar-
range a negotiated peace� However, when the British government in December 
1916 harshly rejected a German peace offer, German leaders changed their opin-
ion� Now the military leaders, especially Hindenburg and Ludendorff, categori-
cally demanded “unrestricted submarine warfare,” claiming it was the last means 
of gaining victory� At a conference on January 9, 1917, after heated discussion, 
the chancellor supported their demand, and the German high command recom-
menced unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917�55 A few weeks later, 
at a meeting of the Main Parliament Committee, Admiral Eduard von Capelle 
(1855–1931), Tirpitz’s successor, “went so far as to insist that the effect of Ameri-
can entry into war would be ‘zero’! American troops would not even be able to 
cross the ocean for lack of transport�”56
In response to unrestricted warfare, the United States broke relations with 
Germany, announcing “armed neutrality�” However, the Entente wanted the Unit-
ed States to enter the war, so the alliance could take utmost advantage of a fully 
mobilized American war economy� Thanks to maladroit German diplomacy, this 
goal soon was accomplished�
Seeking to keep the Americans militarily engaged on their continent and in 
the Pacific Ocean, Germany proposed an alliance with Japan and Mexico� The 
proposal was sent by cable to Mexico in the so-called Zimmermann telegram on 
January 16, 1917� With the aid of captured German codebooks, British naval intel-
ligence managed to decrypt all the German diplomatic cables transmitted among 
Berlin, Washington, and Mexico City� To expedite the U�S� decision-making 
process, the British government transmitted the pertinent cables to Washington, 
and President Wilson had them released to the press on February 28�57
Germany’s offer to Mexico of an alliance inflamed American public opinion 
against Germany� Early in April, the United States entered the war on the side 
of the Allies� Thus, unrestricted submarine warfare alone did not trigger the 
American declaration of war, but Germany’s naval stance contributed to it in a 
substantial way�
On February 1, 1917, Germany had 105 operational submarines available to 
conduct unrestricted submarine warfare� By June 1917, their number had been 
increased to only 129� Because of the increase in operations between February 
and July 1917, repair periods gradually were prolonged, leading to a decrease in 
the number of operationally ready submarines�58
On the other hand, in April 1917 alone, 458 Allied ships totaling 840,000 GRT 
were sunk� This led to a severe crisis for the Allies, who momentarily doubted 
their ability to continue the war� However, Germany did not achieve its strate-
gic objective—effective disruption of British shipping� The Allies introduced 
NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb   15 8/7/17   11:58 AM
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 4, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/3
 R A H N  2 7
convoying in the summer of 1917, and thereafter far fewer ships were sunk. 
Between February and June 1917, an average of 363 ships of 629,863 GRT were 
sunk per month, whereas during the last quarter of 1917 sinkings averaged 159 
per month, totaling 365,489 GRT. In 1918, the numbers of ships sunk decreased 
even further. Because of this, the German naval staff was not able to keep the 
promise it had made: by the autumn of 1918, about 1.4 million American soldiers 
had made it to France. U.S. entry into the war proved to be the decisive factor in 
the defeat of Germany.59
After the Allies introduced the convoy system, German submarines faced seri-
ous operational and tactical problems. The concentration of merchant ships in 
a convoy had to be countered with a concentration of submarines. Even before 
GERMAN SUBMARINE LOSSES 1914–18
Cause 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 Total
Ramming
• By warships
• By merchant vessels
2  1 —
—
 8
 2
 3
 2
 14
 4
Artillery
• By warships
• By merchant vessels
• By Q-ships
—
—
—
 2
 —
 3
 3
—
 2
—
—
 6
 3
 1
—
 
 8
 1
 11
Searching gear with petard —  1  1 —  1  3
Explosion of ammunition aboard a  
merchant vessel
—  — —  1 —  1
Attack by aircraft —  — —  1 —  1
Depth charges —  —  2  7  21  30
Torpedoing —  4  1  7  6  18
Mines 2  2  6  21  23  54
Accidents
• By German mines
• By German torpedoes
• By beaching
• During diving
• Collision with German submarine
—
—
—
—
—
 2
 1
 1
 —
—
 1
—
 2
—
—
 6
—
 2
 1
 1
 1
 1
—
—
—
 10
 2
 5
 1
 1
Unknown 1  2  4 —  7  14
Total 5 19 22 63 69 178
Note: excludes accidents in home waters.
Sources: Robert M. Grant, U-boats Destroyed: The Effect of Anti-submarine Warfare 1914–1918 (London: Putnam, 1964); Robert M. Grant, U-boat Intel-
ligence (London: Putnam, 1969). Cf. Joachim Schröder, Die U-Boote des Kaisers: Die Geschichte des deutschen U-Boot-Krieges gegen Großbritannien im 
Ersten Weltkrieg (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 2003), and Rahn, “Die Kaiserliche Marine und der Erste Weltkrieg,” p. 72.
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that, reconnaissance was required—the convoys had to be detected� The few 
boats available west of the British Isles could not cover the entire operating area, 
allowing many convoys to reach Britain undetected� When a submarine sighted 
a convoy, it could conduct a submerged attack, with torpedoes� The gun arma-
ment, which until the institution of convoying had achieved most results, fell 
into disuse�
Along with introducing the convoy system, the Allies enhanced antisubma-
rine defense by developing more efficient depth charges and the first underwater 
locating devices� But above all, it was the intensive mining of the shipping lanes 
in the North Sea and the English Channel that caused most U-boat casualties� 
Of the 132 German submarines lost in 1917–18, at least fifty sank after hitting 
mines�60
At the end of September 1918, the army’s supreme command admitted 
military defeat and demanded an immediate armistice� The United States made 
termination of unrestricted submarine warfare a precondition for reestablishing 
diplomatic contact� Yet the German naval command—to justify its existence—
prepared to send the fleet out for one final battle� The ships’ companies discerned 
that the naval command was acting arbitrarily and refused to obey� Within a few 
days, this mutiny developed into a revolt that led to the collapse and end of the 
IGN, which accelerated a general uprising in Germany�61
The Lessons of the Great War
In spite of outstanding achievements and successes against a superior opponent 
in various war theaters, the outcome of German naval operations was negative 
at the end of World War I� Not only did the IGN’s strategic concepts for fleet 
employment and for commerce warfare using submarines fail, but those failures 
were the starting point for a revolt that triggered the political overthrow of the 
government� Nevertheless, the High Seas Fleet effectively operated as a fleet in 
being� Its presence pinned down the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea, includ-
ing lighter naval forces, which consequently were not available for convoy-escort 
duty in the Atlantic� The fleet protected the German coast, blocked the Baltic 
against Allied resupply shipments to Russia, and, to a certain extent, backed up 
submarine warfare by keeping the departure and return routes clear� Contrary to 
the current view of historians who entirely deny the fleet’s strategic importance, 
the fleet was an asset for the German war effort; but a realistic cost-benefit analy-
sis shows that, in the end, the fleet did not achieve what it was expected to�
One of the fundamental lessons learned during World War I was that, over the 
long run, an effective blockade could so weaken the German war potential and 
economy, which were greatly dependent on the importation of raw materials, that 
not even defensive operations could be conducted� The German naval command 
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had not realized that sea power, i�e�, the ability to control and successfully use the 
sea, essentially is the product of both fleet strength and geographical position� If 
either factor were deficient, the entire result suffered� This was one of the essential 
reasons the High Seas Fleet did not bring about a decision in the overall conduct 
of the war� It failed to develop a concept in which the two components of naval 
warfare—surface forces and submarines—were integrated to enable timely and ef-
fective deployment against the two key strategic weak points in the enemy alliance: 
Allied merchant shipping in the Atlantic and the Russian coastline in the Baltic�
During the submarine war against Allied merchant shipping, the naval com-
mand rigidly relied on a one-sided and, in the end, inadequate naval concept that 
ignored the possibility and reality of U�S� entry into the war, thereby contributing 
to Germany’s defeat� During the operations against Russia, Germany hardly ever 
exploited its naval superiority� However, Germany’s blocking of access to the 
Baltic, in parallel with its ally’s control of the Turkish straits, diminished Russia’s 
war potential considerably� This success in the economic war, which Germany 
had not foreseen, relieved the country of the necessity to prosecute the war on 
two fronts by the spring of 1918; but that was too late to bring about success for 
the overall war effort�
The result Germany experienced in World War I was due not only to insuf-
ficient concepts and means but to the naval command’s strategic incompetence� 
The leadership seemed to be incapable of recognizing the natural limits that 
existed—limits that would have to be imposed on any German naval strategy 
within the overall strategic concept�
THE INTERWAR PERIOD, 1919–39
The Treaty of Versailles reduced Germany to the status of a third-rate naval 
power�62 Submarines and military aircraft were forbidden to it altogether� As a 
result, the navy lacked the weapons that modern naval warfare required� How-
ever, French opposition thwarted the British attempt to abolish the submarine 
entirely; Paris became the champion of minor naval powers by emphasizing the 
importance of the submarine as a naval weapon for weaker nations�63 During 
the preparation of the peace treaty, Admiral William S� Benson (1855–1932), 
the American Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), advocated only moderate cuts 
in the strength of the future German navy so as to maintain a counterbalance to 
the British fleet in the North Sea�64 The British never considered taking over the 
German ships for their own fleet—too costly; they simply wanted to sink them� 
However, France and Italy dismissed this idea� The problem was solved when the 
Germans themselves sank the major part of their fleet at Scapa Flow on June 21, 
1919�65 The German naval command regarded this accomplishment primarily 
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as a moral success� The consequences of the scuttling were severe: the Allies 
demanded full compensation, and claimed 80 percent of all German port equip-
ment; and the navy had to surrender its last five modern light cruisers�
German naval forces came to seem superfluous, given the total military de-
feat of 1918, the domestic unrest of 1919, and the ongoing border conflicts with 
Poland� However, for the navy to continue in existence and preserve its indepen-
dence from the army, the service required a plausible long-run mission� When, 
during the peace negotiations in the spring of 1919, the German government 
offered to renounce its force of six old battleships so as to achieve concessions 
in other areas, the victorious powers refused, pointing out that Germany should 
retain some limited naval forces for its own protection� They projected a small 
German fleet as a stabilizing factor in the Baltic area� Thus, Germany’s former en-
emies contributed considerably to the continued existence—modest as it was—of 
the German navy�66
The naval command argued that a navy was necessary because of the territo-
rial changes in eastern Europe, referring primarily to the alterations to Poland’s 
borders and the resultant isolation of East Prussia� In 1919–21, a Polish-Russian 
border dispute led to war, and future border conflicts could not be ruled out�67 If 
Germany had no naval forces at all, it would be impossible to defend East Prussia; 
the Poles would be able to cut the sea route across the Baltic—the only reliable 
line of supply for the German enclave�
The navy’s deliberations, unlike those of the army, soon expanded to consider 
other possible conflicts� As early as 1922 they took into account Poland’s ties with 
France� Once again, German naval strategy focused its attention on the North 
Sea� Given the German economy’s great dependence on seaborne supplies, the 
prerequisites for conducting defensive operations could be achieved only if Ger-
man shipping in the North and Baltic Seas continued unhindered�
The navy considered itself to be an instrument of territorial defense against 
France and Poland, while hoping, in better times to come, for an end to arma-
ment restrictions� When it became apparent that the limitations on their own 
arms that the victorious powers had announced at Versailles were not going to 
materialize, the German government consistently aspired to equal rights and na-
tional sovereignty in the military sphere, such that it could develop the country’s 
armed forces into an effective instrument of national defense�
In terms of matériel, a new start gradually was made, by constructing some 
torpedo boats and light cruisers� However, the challenge of developing a ten-
thousand-ton armored vessel (permitted by the peace treaty) that had sufficient 
combat power to survive an engagement with French capital ships was a tough 
nut to crack� Given the displacement limitation, it was not possible to meet nor-
mal requirements for armament and armor plating� When the changes in the 
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armament limitations for which the naval command had hoped failed to materi-
alize, the navy was forced to concentrate on designing a ship that was more like 
a cruiser than a battleship�
The decisive elements that influenced this change in planning lay on two 
levels, the tactical-operational and the political-military� In the tactical- 
operational sphere, exercises showed that heavy naval forces needed more 
speed� In the political-military sphere, the naval command thought it impera-
tive that every German ship 
constructed be superior in at 
least one respect to the war-
ship categories defined in the 
Washington Naval Agreement 
(encompassing multiple trea-
ties) of 1922� For battleships, 
it sought speed; for cruisers, heavy guns� To replace the old battleships while 
remaining under the terms of the peace treaty, the naval command planned a 
ship carrying six twenty-eight-centimeter (cm) guns and capable of twenty-eight 
knots�
To understand the German line of reasoning, it is necessary to look at the sta-
tus of international naval armaments at the end of the 1920s� The countries that 
had signed the Washington Naval Treaty (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the 
United States) had navies dominated by capital ships having eight to twelve heavy 
guns (with calibers between 30�5 and 40�6 cm) and speeds of twenty to twenty-
three knots� Only Britain and Japan had battle cruisers equipped with six to eight 
heavy guns� These had a top speed between twenty-seven and thirty-one knots� 
Until 1930, the Washington Naval Treaty limited the total tonnage and construc-
tion of battleships and aircraft carriers� For cruisers, the treaty established ceil-
ings only for the displacement and armament of individual vessels� Thus, cruisers 
with a standard displacement of ten thousand tons and light armor were built� 
Their main armament comprised six to ten 20�3 cm guns; they had a top speed of 
thirty-three knots� Although they could evade the slower capital ships, they had 
to avoid contact with battle cruisers, which were capable of similar speed yet far 
superior in armament�
Since the core of the French fleet consisted of nine slow capital ships and five 
fast heavy cruisers, the German naval command deliberately endowed its ten-
thousand-ton vessel with the characteristics of a “small battle-cruiser”: it was 
superior to cruisers in armament and to capital ships in speed� With six 28 cm 
guns in two triple turrets and a speed of twenty-six to twenty-eight knots, the 
Panzerschiff (armored ship, also known as a “pocket battleship”) came very close 
to the concept of the battle cruiser� Moreover, diesel engines would give the ship a 
Over the course of the twentieth century, Ger-
many twice tried to force a strategic decision, 
in direct confrontation with the Anglo-Saxon 
naval powers, by cutting the Atlantic shipping 
routes. Both attempts ended in failure.
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maximum range of twenty thousand miles, vastly exceeding that of any cruiser or 
capital ship� Owing to its combat effectiveness and endurance, the pocket battle-
ship was suitable for both warfare in the North Sea and offensive operations in 
the Atlantic�
The construction of the ship immediately attracted the attention of foreign na-
val experts� In April 1929, the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold 
(1869–1941), reported to his government as follows:
From a naval technical point of view, the building of this vessel is to be welcomed, as 
its design promises to include a number of new features in warship construction� The 
principal of these are reported to be a comparatively heavy armament of six 11-inch 
guns, eight 5�8-inch and twenty antiaircraft guns, six torpedo tubes, adequate armour 
protection, special Diesel engines giving a cruising speed of 26 knots, the extensive 
employment of light metals and electric welding in place of riveting, and the highest 
degree of unsinkability�68
However, Germany’s naval command regarded the construction of pocket 
battleships not just as a military necessity but as a political-military lever with 
which to upset the entire system of international naval armament controls that 
had been established—without German participation—at Washington in 1922� 
The naval command hoped this step would give Germany the chance to be 
readmitted to the community of major naval powers�69 Of course, if Germany 
had been included in the Washington Naval Agreement, this would have been 
tantamount to a wholesale abrogation of the naval arms limitations laid down in 
the Treaty of Versailles�
Change of Strategy and Operational Planning
The naval command was cognizant that Germany was highly dependent on 
seaborne imports� It tried to impress this overall strategic reality on the army so 
the latter would take that factor into account when drawing up its operational 
plans� From 1928 onward, the new minister of the Reichswehr (German Impe-
rial Defense), Lieutenant General Wilhelm Groener (Ret�) (1867–1939), set new 
standards for all operational planning by the army and navy� He stressed that the 
idea of a large-scale war had to be ruled out from the start� Military operations 
against foreign powers should be limited to two possible types of conflict: (1) 
repelling raids from neighboring states onto German territory; (2) maintaining 
armed neutrality during a conflict between foreign powers�
Groener demanded that the Reichswehr be combat ready to oppose immedi-
ately any sudden Polish invasion� For the navy, this new concept meant it had to 
be able, on seventy-two hours’ notice, to begin operations to destroy the Polish 
navy and neutralize the port of Gdynia as a naval base�70 Such a demonstrative 
strike clearly was intended to be part of a strategy of deterrence� Under this 
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concept of calculated escalation, the German government could react quickly 
to a possible invasion, then refer the conflict to the League of Nations without 
delay� Thus, the government gave the navy, for the first time, a role as an effective 
instrument of crisis management�
In the spring of 1929, Groener requested that the naval command review 
whether Germany, to conduct its maritime defense, would need any surface 
units that went beyond the ceiling of the peace treaty� By so inquiring, Groener 
got at the heart of the self-perception of the navy’s leadership, which saw its 
service not merely as an instrument of national defense but, in the long run, as 
an indispensable prerequisite for a future German maritime position of power� 
Under no circumstances would a return to brown-water-navy status be accept-
able; the German navy instead intended to build oceangoing units, in accordance 
with the traditional concept of naval prestige, and thereby to express hope for a 
better future� Naturally, it was not possible, nor was it intended, to explain this to 
a minister who, although he had pushed the Panzerschiff through the Reichstag 
(national legislature), otherwise had expressed often his critical attitude toward 
the buildup of the German High Seas Fleet before 1914�
In his reply to Groener’s question, “Does Germany need large warships?,” 
the chief of naval command, Admiral Erich Raeder (1876–1960), championed 
the earlier naval concept, which focused on a potential conflict with France and 
Poland�71 He argued that the attitude of the navy must not be determined by 
wishful thinking to reestablish itself as a major naval power� Its most important 
task in war was to prevent—at all costs—enemy forces from interdicting German 
SLOCs� World War I had proved the connection between German resistance at 
the home front and naval blockade: “Cutting off our sea lanes is the simplest and 
safest way, without any bloodshed, of defeating us� Our enemies know this as 
well� England has the most powerful fleet world-wide and its geographical posi-
tion is disastrous for Germany� Therefore, any armed conflict has to be avoided 
that would turn England into one of our enemies� We would be doomed to failure 
right from the start�”72
Raeder’s memorandum concluded that the navy—without even considering 
the limits the peace treaty set—could fight the fleet only of a second-class sea 
power, such as France�
Naval Rearmament under Hitler, 1933–37
A few days after seizing power in January 1933, Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) made 
it clear to naval and other military commanders that he intended to develop the 
armed forces into an instrument of his power politics� As far as the translation of 
this objective into armament was concerned, Hitler was initially cautious� As he 
explained in a speech on February 3, 1933: “The most dangerous period is that 
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of rearmament� Then we shall see whether France has statesmen� If she does, she 
will not grant us time but will jump on us (presumably with eastern satellites)�”73
The Reichsmarine (German Navy) had to make do with compromises regard-
ing the displacement and armament of its future capital ships� However, in view 
of the anticipated long-term buildup of the fleet, these compromises seemed 
acceptable� The last of three Panzerschiffe was launched in June 1934� The next 
two units were upgraded to battle cruisers (31,000 tons, thirty-one knots, nine 
28 cm guns) in answer to the French battle cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg�74
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, allowed Germany to 
have a surface fleet with a tonnage up to 35 percent of that of the British Em-
pire� German naval leaders now believed they had attained their goal of “equal” 
rights� The 35 percent ceiling applied not just to total tonnage but to individual 
categories of warships� In the case of U-boats, Germany was allowed to achieve 
45 percent at first, later 100 percent, of British submarine strength� In this con-
text, Germany gave assurances that its navy would adhere to what were known 
as the “cruiser rules” regarding submarine warfare conducted against merchant 
shipping�75
The navy’s planning thus was based wholly on the structure of that of the other 
naval powers� Its motto was: What the other navies, with their rich traditions, 
consider proper, and what Germany now is permitted within the 35 percent 
ceiling, is what Germany will build� The navy started to build a so-called nor-
mal fleet: fast capital ships, heavy and light cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, 
and—for the first time after seventeen years—submarines� One week after the 
Anglo-German Naval Agreement was announced, the navy commissioned its 
first, small (250-ton) U-boat—thereby revealing its long-term secret preparatory 
activity in this area�76
Even if the U-boat had not been improved in basic ways since 1918, it had 
developed considerably in every direction (e�g�, in its improved torpedoes, its 
minelaying ability, and its capacity to transmit and receive signals both while sur-
faced and while submerged)� Nevertheless, opinion was widespread in all navies 
that the U-boat had lost the eminence it had achieved in World War I as one of 
the most effective naval weapons� The British Admiralty was convinced that asdic 
(a submarine location device named after its progenitor, the Anti-Submarine 
Detection Investigation Committee) had reduced the submarine threat almost to 
extinction� In contrast to this opinion, the small German U-boat staff, centered 
on Captain Karl Dönitz (1891–1980), was convinced that antisubmarine warfare 
(ASW) weapons were greatly overrated and had not made decisive progress since 
1918�77
From 1928 onward, Admiral Raeder determined the navy’s thinking� In study-
ing Germany’s World War I cruiser campaign, he had come to the conclusion 
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that during the autumn of 1914 there had been a strategic correlation between 
the North Sea campaign and the operations of the cruiser squadrons in the Pa-
cific and South Atlantic� Raeder realized that all naval theaters of war formed an 
interconnected whole, so any operation had to be viewed in relation to those in 
other areas� Accordingly, he made overseas cruiser warfare and battle-fleet opera-
tions in home waters integral components of a single naval strategy that sought to 
exploit diversionary effects, thereby exhausting the enemy’s forces and disrupting 
his supplies�78
Raeder formulated his strategic thinking most clearly in a briefing to Hitler 
on February 3, 1937� Analyzing Germany’s Great War experiences, he pointed 
out the correlation between strategy and a country’s military-geographical situ-
ation� Raeder was aware of the likely “totality” of a future war—that it would be 
a struggle not just between forces but of “nation versus nation�” He emphasized 
the negative consequences for Germany if it were unable to procure continually 
the raw materials it lacked� In so doing, Raeder pointed out the glaring weak-
nesses in Germany’s war potential—but was unable to influence Hitler’s policy 
of confrontation�79
Buildup of the Navy against Britain, 1938–39
A fundamental change in strategic planning by the Kriegsmarine (as the German 
navy was known after 1935) commenced in spring 1938� As it became apparent 
that the Western powers opposed German expansion, Hitler issued a directive 
that all German war preparations should consider not only France and Russia but 
also Britain as potential enemies� A second confrontation with Britain now influ-
enced all further planning for the next naval war� Raeder followed Hitler’s hazard-
ous course of confrontation willingly, or at least without protest, in contravention 
of his strong statement on this matter to Groener in 1929� Raeder assumed— 
erroneously—that the navy would have several years of peace to continue its 
buildup�
In the summer of 1938, the naval staff produced a strategic study that con-
cluded that, given a geographical starting position similar to that of 1914, only 
oceanic cruiser warfare, employing improved Panzerschiffe and U-boats, held 
any prospect of success�80 Despite this realization, a planning committee of senior 
officers busied itself with the question of what tasks battleships could perform 
in a cruiser war in the Atlantic� The result was paradoxical and revealing: “The 
chief of staff of the naval staff concluded at the end of the discussion that all par-
ticipants agreed that battleships were necessary, but that no consensus regarding 
their use could be achieved for the time being�”81
Traditionalists considered the most important arm of naval power to be 
capital ships� Focusing on them meant that the concept of sea control pushed 
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the concept of sea denial into the background� Unlike the big-ship traditionalist 
Tirpitz, the naval staff during the 1930s had proposed a sea-denial strategy re-
peatedly� In contrast, the suggestion to develop a German strategy of sea control 
constituted a new, alternative approach to sea and world power in the twentieth 
century� In September 1938, the commander in chief of the fleet, Admiral Rolf 
Carls (1885–1945), noted as follows: “If, in accordance with the will of the Führer, 
Germany is to achieve a firm world-power position, it will need, in addition to 
sufficient colonies, secure sea 
routes and access to the high 
seas� � � � A war against Brit-
ain means a war against the 
Empire, against France, prob-
ably also against Russia and a 
number of countries overseas, 
in other words against one-
half or two-thirds of the whole 
world�”82
Nevertheless, Raeder was 
more inclined toward a sea-
denial strategy via an oceanic 
cruiser campaign with Pan-
zerschiffe, and he intended to 
give this strategy priority in the future armament program� However, by Novem-
ber 1938 he had been unable to gain Hitler’s support for his program� Hitler did 
not accept the cruiser warfare strategy, insisting instead that the navy step up the 
pace of its battleship construction so that as soon as possible he would have at his 
disposal an instrument of power he could employ globally�
The navy had to accept this decisive change� It formulated a new concept, the 
so-called Z-Plan, which centered on the construction of six capital ships by 1944� 
Additionally, battle cruisers, Panzerschiffe, aircraft carriers, fast light cruisers, 
and 247 U-boats were to form the backbone of German naval forces for the future 
Battle of the Atlantic� On January 27, 1939, when Hitler ordered that the buildup 
of the navy was to take precedence over all other tasks, including the rearma-
ment of the army and the Luftwaffe (air force), he heralded a gigantic buildup 
of naval forces� Within a few months, the planning of a series of six new-design, 
diesel-driven battleships was complete; the construction of two units began in 
the summer of 1939� In the meantime, on April 27, 1939, Hitler denounced the 
Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935�83
The experiences of World War I acted as the starting point for developing the 
so-called pack tactics that German U-boats employed against enemy sea routes 
The allied forces—especially . . . Admiral 
Arleigh Burke . . . —supported . . . creation 
[of the Federal German Navy]. . . . [A] close 
cooperation and friendship developed between 
Admiral Burke and Vice Admiral Friedrich  
Ruge . . . , the first head of the [FGN]. Burke 
created a basis of confidence with his firm 
conviction that allied forces could fulfill their 
common tasks only if their cooperation were 
based on openness and mutual trust. Vice 
Admiral Ruge succeeded in establishing this 
basis of confidence, which today is accepted as 
a matter of course.
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during World War II�84 Dönitz recognized that the concentration of merchant 
shipping in convoys would require a similar concentration of U-boats to counter� 
And before the U-boats could attack a convoy, they needed to locate it—in other 
words, the problem of reconnaissance would have to be solved� In 1917–18, a 
number of U-boats had attacked successfully on the surface, under cover of dark-
ness� During the evaluation of wartime experiences, former U-boat command-
ers recommended adoption and further development of this method of attack� 
Dönitz also had drawn attention to the advantages of night attacks in his book 
Die U-Bootswaffe, published in 1939� Nonetheless, later in World War II, this type 
of attack took British ASW defenses by surprise—they had relied too much on 
the supposed superiority of asdic� The escort forces were unable to cope with the 
German tactic, particularly as asdic had an effective range of no more than about 
1,400 meters, which left it ineffective against U-boats operating on the surface�85
WORLD WAR II
Disillusionment came on September 3, 1939� Totally unexpectedly, Hitler or-
dered the navy to launch a naval war against Britain�86 The German navy was in 
no way prepared� Raeder’s initial estimate of the situation was very pessimistic, 
and he resigned himself to the realization that neither the few U-boats nor the 
surface forces would have any decisive effect on the outcome of the war: “They 
can do no more than show that they know how to die gallantly and thus are will-
ing to create the foundations for later reconstruction�”87
However, the progress of the war soon demanded a new estimate of the situ-
ation� Nine months on, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands had been occupied; by June 22, 1940, France had suffered a total 
defeat� German naval control extended from Norway to the Pyrenees� Therefore, 
the German naval staff switched to an offensive concept of naval warfare, aimed 
solely at destroying Britain’s maritime transport capacity� The Kriegsmarine’s 
surface forces were insufficient for such a task; to supplement them, the navy 
concentrated on constructing and employing the means of naval warfare that had 
proved its worth during World War I—the U-boat�
The naval staff knew from its experience during the previous war that employ-
ment of the U-boat against the enemy’s merchant marine could be successful only 
if U-boats were deployed continuously along the enemy’s SLOCs, employing as 
many vessels as possible� The navy calculated that the number of U-boats perma-
nently at sea should range from 100 to 150 boats� Taking into consideration time 
for maintenance and resupply, this meant the navy needed approximately three 
hundred operational boats at its disposal�88 In the quest to achieve this, time was 
an important factor:
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1� In an economic war waged against a country that depended on supplies 
by sea, success could only be achieved in the long run� It was therefore 
a question of continuously weakening the enemy’s maritime transport 
capacity to an extent that exceeded the rate at which the enemy could 
construct new merchantmen�
2� From the summer of 1940 onward, it became apparent that the British 
war effort increasingly was being supported by the resources of the United 
States� This made the naval staff intent on “putting Britain out of action 
soon, before the effects of even greater American aid made themselves 
felt�”89
3� Since it took around two years to construct a U-boat and bring it to 
operational status, amassing the numbers the navy envisaged so as to 
achieve the necessary concentration of forces required plans to be made at 
a very early stage�90
While a numerically increasing U-boat fleet held out the prospect of German 
success, the naval staff had to take into account that the enemy, in view of the 
looming threat, would do everything he could to strengthen his ASW effort�
In October 1939, the naval command presented a U-boat buildup plan that 
set a monthly rate of twenty-nine boats� Hitler approved the plan; however, he 
refused to sanction priority, since he was at that time more concerned with the 
demands of the imminent land campaign against France�91 One year later, in 
November 1940, the navy had to realize that U-boat construction was being held 
up by shortages, and that the current building rate barely covered the current 
loss rate� The naval staff foresaw that there would be limits to the Reich’s mate-
rial resources and production capacities� In December 1940, it viewed America’s 
growing support of Britain as a dangerous development “towards a marked pro-
longation of the war�” To the naval staff, this portended a “very negative effect on 
the overall German war strategy�”92 This statement expressed the simple, obvious 
fact that Germany could not win a prolonged war of attrition against the two 
Atlantic naval powers�
For this reason, in December 1940, Grand Admiral Raeder requested that Hit-
ler “recognize that the greatest task of the hour is concentration of all our power 
against Britain�” To Raeder, this meant focusing air and naval forces against Brit-
ish supplies� The admiral was firmly convinced that U-boats were the decisive 
weapon to be used against Britain� Although Hitler did not reject Raeder’s view, 
he referred to the allegedly new political situation: the necessity “to eliminate at 
all cost the last enemy remaining [i�e�, Soviet Russia] on the continent, before he 
can collaborate with Britain� � � � After that, everything can be concentrated on the 
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needs of the Air Force and the Navy�”93 In Hitler’s eyes, Britain was not the enemy 
on which all weapons had to be concentrated, but a potential partner who might 
be made to “see reason” if an appropriate amount of military pressure were ap-
plied� Hitler also knew that a forced economic war could not lead to any marked 
success in one year� Furthermore, this kind of effort could increase the danger of 
the United States entering the war, something he sought to avoid at that point�94
In July 1941, after the first successes in the war against Russia, the naval staff 
tried to convince both the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) Command and Hitler of 
the immediate strategic necessity to concentrate on fighting the Anglo-Saxon 
naval powers� Analyzing the threat to which Germany was exposed, the naval 
staff portrayed the dilemma of a European continental state that lacked the vital 
elements of a naval power but was forced to fight against the greatest naval pow-
ers: “While in World War I we had the second strongest battle fleet in the world 
but no appropriate operational base, we now dispose of a strategically favorable 
operational base, however, we do not have the required battle fleet to operate 
within the Atlantic�”95
The naval staff predicted that the two Allied naval powers would continue to 
fight, even if the Soviet Union collapsed, so they could reach their “final goal”: 
destroying Germany on the continent� The naval staff came to the conclusion that 
“the enemies’ prospect for the battle in the Atlantic for the year 1942 must be as-
sessed as favorable�” For this reason, the naval staff advocated that Germany bring 
about a decision in the Atlantic by taking advantage of both political assets (the 
cooperation of Vichy-France and Japan) and military assets (the concentrated 
employment of all available forces, in particular the U-boats and air forces)�96
From 1940 onward, Germany possessed a good geographical position for 
naval warfare in the Atlantic, but this basis could not be exploited fully, owing 
to insufficient weaponry� The U-boat provided an effective weapon in the fight 
against enemy shipping up to 1942, but thereafter wider war demands, especially 
the critical situations in the Mediterranean and on the eastern front, forced the 
naval command to employ its last remaining offensive capability like an “opera-
tional fire brigade�”97 This led to enormous attrition, which was counterproduc-
tive to the strategic concept of mass concentration in the Atlantic� As the Allies 
developed better ASW weapons, the concept of a “U-boat war” failed in 1943 
because the submarine had lost its ability to escape from enemy surveillance�
In fact, the concept of attrition warfare began to fail by the fall of 1942 in the 
face of the mobilization of Allied resources and industrial capacities, especially 
those of the United States� The German naval staff analysis at that time of the 
accelerating buildup of Allied maritime transport capacity already revealed that 
the U-boats could not increase the monthly rate of sinkings to a level necessary 
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to win the “tonnage race�” The naval staff delivered a pessimistic prognosis: “If, 
� � � considering the enemy’s rising production output, Germany wishes to dimin-
ish the enemy’s tonnage from the end of 1942 onwards to the same extent as is 
currently being achieved, ship sinkings per month will have to be increased to 
approximately 1,300,000 GRT� Given the current situation, it is doubtful whether 
such a high rate of ship sinkings will be feasible for a sustained period of time�”98 
Recalling the historical argument that “no war in history � � � has yet been won by 
the use of one method of warfare,” the naval staff came around to an understand-
ing that reflected actual conditions�99 By the end of 1942, German U-boats, as a 
realistic threat, had succumbed to the immense industrial capacity of the United 
States�
From 1943 onward, the navy had an officer at the helm, Grand Admiral 
Dönitz, who both was a charismatic leader and had close links to Hitler and Nazi 
ideology� Not until after Hitler’s death did he change “from the almost-blind tool 
of a criminal to the responsible soldier of the traditional Prussian school�”100 At 
that point he did everything in his power to end the already-lost war in a proper 
fashion and, at the same time, to evacuate as many people as possible across the 
Baltic to the West� The latter effort—the navy’s last wartime act—brought the 
service much positive postwar public recognition�101
Over the course of the twentieth century, Germany twice tried to force a stra-
tegic decision, in direct confrontation with the Anglo-Saxon naval powers, by 
cutting the Atlantic shipping routes� Both attempts ended in failure� The second 
defeat brought with it the end of the German Reich and the dissolution of all 
German armed forces�
BUILDING A NEW NAVY AFTER 1955
The Western orientation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) led to close 
integration of the new German armed forces into the Atlantic Alliance�102 Ten 
years after the surrender of Germany’s World War II forces, a new German naval 
force came into existence� The allied forces—especially the U�S� Navy, including 
its CNO, Admiral Arleigh Burke (1901–96)—supported its creation� During the 
first years of the buildup, a close cooperation and friendship developed between 
Admiral Burke and Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge (1894–1985), the first head of 
the Federal German Navy (FGN)�103
Burke created a basis of confidence with his firm conviction that allied forces 
could fulfill their common tasks only if their cooperation were based on open-
ness and mutual trust� Vice Admiral Ruge succeeded in establishing this basis of 
confidence, which today is accepted as a matter of course�
This meant for the FGN, the smallest of the armed services within the FRG 
armed forces, that, for the first time in its history, the naval service was obliged 
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merely to perform that function “which a German Navy can actually perform,” 
in close cooperation with the great maritime powers�104
At the same time the FRG joined NATO in May 1955, the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) was integrated into the Warsaw Pact� The formation of light 
naval forces ensued, out of the Volkspolizei See (i�e�, the national sea police force 
of the GDR) that had been in existence since 1950� In 1960, the GDR’s newly es-
tablished forces were termed Volksmarine (People’s Navy), in commemoration of 
the 1918 revolutionary tradition� This navy, which was strictly integrated within 
the ideological leadership claimed by the Communist Party, demonstrated little 
continuity with former German naval forces, whether in formation, structure, or 
mandate� Within the Warsaw Pact it evolved into an offensive naval force for use 
in confined and littoral waters� 
The two German naval forces exhibited great disparity until 1990� Each navy 
regarded the other as a potential military adversary in the context of the system 
of alliances� However, both were spared the necessity to prove their combat 
strength� With the reunification of the German republics in the fall of 1990, parts 
of each were incorporated into the German navy�105
Today, the German navy has not only a lively interest in its history but a special re-
lationship to it� A clear link can be seen between the historical self-understanding 
of its officers and the history of their service� In the past, this link often served 
only as an attempt to legitimize and secure the service’s position� The navy, which 
came into being in the mid-nineteenth century, often had to fight for recognition 
and even for its existence during a relatively short history� However, when histori-
cal interest is limited only to the navy and naval warfare, there is a danger that too 
little attention will be paid to the overlapping political correlations�
Nowadays the situation is different� Germany is one of the leading export 
nations in the world, and therefore extremely dependent on trade and the un-
hampered use of the high seas� This situation requires an understanding and an 
acceptance of the maritime domain as a vital Achilles’ heel for the prosperity of 
the German economy and society� This situation underlines the necessity for a 
well-balanced navy that is able to conduct demonstrations and to protect German 
maritime interests, in cooperation with alliances and partners� The situation for 
the German navy is much more comfortable at present than in previous eras, 
reinforcing its self-confidence; but a wider understanding of its roles is needed, 
now more than ever�
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